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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the cyclical properties of the average effective tax rate in 26 
OECD countries over 1965-2003 in order to test the validity of three theories of fiscal 
policy: (i) the standard Keynesian theory which recommends that tax policy should be 
counter-cyclical, (ii) the Tax Smoothing hypothesis, which implies that changes in GDP 
should be uncorrelated with tax rates, and (iii) the positive theory of Battaglini and Coate 
(2008) which predicts that the average tax rate should be negatively correlated with GDP.  
Our main finding is that the correlations of tax rates with cyclical GDP are generally 
quite small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  This finding is quite robust and 
is more consistent with the implications of the Tax Smoothing hypothesis than either the 
recommendations of the standard Keynesian model or the predictions of Battaglini and 
Coate’s theory. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Tax Rates, Business Cycle. 
JEL: E62, E32. 
                                                 
*   
This work has been carried out while Davide Furceri was working as economist at the Fiscal Policy 
division at the European Central Bank. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem, the OECD or its member countries. 
 
#
 Mailing address: OECD, 2 rue Andre Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16. Email: 
davide.furceri@oecd.org; furceri.economia@unipa.it  
## Mailing address: University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of Economics, 601 South Morgan Street, 
60607 Chicago, IL.  E-mail:  gkarras@uic.edu. 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Is fiscal policy pro-cyclical?  Should it be?  The standard Keynesian model 
implies that fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical, i.e. government spending should 
increase in economic contractions and fall in expansions, while taxes should follow the 
opposite pattern.  At the same time, Tax Smoothing models inspired by Barro (1979) 
suggest that the government should smooth the tax rate, by borrowing in recessions and 
repaying in booms.  In other words, changes in GDP will be positively correlated with tax 
revenue, but should be uncorrelated with tax rates and tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP.
1
 
The empirical literature has tried to test the main recommendations of both of 
these normative theories.
2
  Focusing on the cyclicality of government expenditure, the 
basic finding has been that government spending tends to be slightly pro-cyclical in 
developed countries and strongly pro-cyclical in developing countries.
3
   
                                                 
1
 Versions of the theory also predict that changes in GDP should be uncorrelated with government spending 
but negatively correlated with government spending as a proportion of GDP, and that debt will be 
increasing in booms and decreasing in the recessions, i.e. debt is positively correlated with changes in 
GDP.  For an example of the “traditional” Keynesian theory, see Romer (2006, chapter 5).  For an 
exposition of the Tax Smoothing hypothesis in terms of the average effective tax rate, see Romer (2006, 
chapter 11). 
 
2
 See, for example, Gavin and Perotti (1997), Sorensen et al. (2001), Lane (2003), Alesina et al. (2008), 
Talvi and Vegh (2005), and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008).  
 
3
 A possible explanation can be found in the literature of credit supply.  In fact, as argued by Catao and 
Sutton (2002) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004), developing countries become credit constrained 
during economic downturns, or can borrow only at very high interest rates. This precludes governments 
from effectively smoothing economic fluctuations. As a result, government expenditure increases during 
good times and decreases during bad times, i.e. fiscal policies become procyclical. Another explanation to 
account for different behavior of fiscal policy is political factors. Persson (2001), Persson and Tabellini 
(2001), Alesina et al. (2008), find that political and institutional variables matter also for fiscal 
responsiveness.  In particular, Alesina et al. (2008) show that most of the procyclicality of fiscal policy in 
developing countries can be explained by high levels of corruption in those countries. The authors build a 
model where a high degree of corruption means that surpluses accumulated in good times when fiscal 
policy is countercyclical are not optimal because the electorate knows that corrupt political representation 
would misappropriate them. It is then rational for the electorate to demand higher spending during 
expansions, i.e. pro-cyclical fiscal policy. 
 3 
These findings have been interpreted as suggesting that fiscal policy behavior is 
not consistent with Keynesian recommendations, and only partly consistent (for some 
developed countries) with the Tax Smoothing hypothesis. 
In contrast, both findings appear to be consistent with the political economy 
theory of fiscal policy recently proposed by Battaglini and Coate (2008).  The economic 
model underlying this theory is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which 
a single good is produced using labour, whose productivity depends on the business 
cycle. The political economy component of the model assumes that policy choices in 
each period are made by a legislature comprised of representatives elected by single-
member, geographically-defined districts.
4
 
The main prediction of this theory is that fiscal policy is pro-cyclical.  In 
particular, the model demonstrates that government spending increases in booms and 
decreases during recessions, while tax rates decrease during booms and increase in 
recessions.  In other words, the theory predicts that government spending as share of 
GDP should be neutral over the cycle and that tax revenue as percentage of GDP should 
be negatively correlated with changes of GDP.  As we have already said, these 
predictions appear to be broadly consistent with the empirical evidence on government 
spending, but are they also with the evidence on tax revenue? 
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the literature by investigating the 
relation between tax rates and GDP changes.  In particular, we will try to assess whether 
tax revenues as a share of GDP are positively or negatively correlated with the cyclical 
                                                 
4
 The model assumes that the government can raise revenues in two ways (via a proportional tax on labour 
income and by issuing one period risk-free bonds) and that public revenues are used to finance the 
provision of public goods. The level of public debt and the persistent level of productivity are the state 
variables, creating a dynamic linkage across policy-making periods.  
 
 4 
component of real GDP.  This will test the predictions of Battaglini and Coate’s (2008) 
positive theory and compare them with the normative frameworks of the standard 
Keynesian model and tax smoothing. 
To this purpose we compute the correlations between average effective tax rates 
and cyclical output using a set of 26 OECD countries for which we have data from 1965 
to 2003.  The results show that the correlations for the great majority of countries are not 
statistically significantly different from zero.  Moreover, in order to differentiate between 
different phases of the business cycle, we compute these correlations over expansions 
(defined as periods with positive cyclical components) and downturns (defined as periods 
with negative cyclical components). Again, the results uncover almost no statistically 
significant correlations.  
All our findings are robust to the different types of taxes we tried, which include 
the following: i) total taxes; ii) taxes on income, profits, and capital gains; iii) social 
security contributions; iv) taxes on payroll and workforce; v) taxes on property; vi) taxes 
on goods and services; vii) other taxes.  Moreover, the results are also robust to using a 
panel framework in assessing the relationship between tax rates and changes in the 
cyclical component of GDP. 
Thus, the empirical evidence of our paper is largely consistent with the Tax 
Smoothing hypothesis, while it seems to be inconsistent with both the standard 
Keynesian recommendations and the predictions of the theory proposed by Battaglini and 
Coate (2008).  Taken together with the literature’s findings on the cyclical behavior of 
government spending, our results call for a new theory of fiscal policy that is consistent 
 5 
with the empirical evidence on the behavior of both government spending and revenue 
(as well as debt) over the cycle. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the empirical 
methodology and the data we use to assess the pattern of tax revenue over the cycle.  
Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results, and section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and Empirical Methodology 
All tax data are from the Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 
database, and measure various taxes as a percentage of GDP.  In particular, we consider 
the following average effective tax rates: i) total taxes; ii) taxes on income, profits, and 
capital gains; iii) social security contributions; iv) taxes on payroll and workforce;  v) 
taxes on property; vi) taxes on goods and services; vii) other taxes.  
Table 1 provides a list of these 26 OECD economies together with country 
averages over 1965-2003 for the seven tax series.
5
  The average total tax rate has varied 
from 17.2% in Mexico to 46.7% in Sweden.  Though these OECD countries have relied 
very differently on the various forms of taxes, income taxation has been the largest 
revenue generator for most of them.
6
  Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains have 
ranged from 4.6% of GDP in Mexico to 25.1% of GDP in Denmark.  In nine of the 
countries, most of the revenues were raised by taxes on goods and services.
7
  Only in 
                                                 
5
 Country selection is dictated by data availability only. 
6
 To be specific, for 14 countries out of the 26: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.  
7
 The nine are Austria, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey.  
 6 
three countries has the largest share been generated by social security taxes,
8
 and in none 
of the countries by property taxes, which are generally the smallest. 
As shown in Figure 1, total tax rates in these OECD countries have generally 
increased over time, but with important differences among countries, in terms of starting 
and ending values. 
Real GDP data are obtained from the OECD’s Economic Outlook database. We 
consider the same set of 26 countries for most of which we have data on taxes from 1965 
to 2003.
9
 
We have tried several methods of obtaining the cyclical components of GDP.  
First, we use three different filtering techniques to detrend the (log) output series of each 
country and estimate its cyclical component: i) the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a 
smoothness parameter equal to 100; ii) the HP filter with a smoothness parameter equal 
to 6.25; and iii) a Band-Pass filter.  These are among the most commonly used detrending 
methods in the business-cycle literature.  As an additional measure of cyclical GDP we 
also considered data of the output GAP from the OECD Economic Outlook n.86 (2009)
10
.  
As our main findings proved quite robust to these different cyclical measures, we will 
only report results based on the HP-6.25 filter in the next section to preserve space.
 11
  
 
                                                 
8
 These three are France, Germany, and Italy.  
9
 The exceptions are Iceland (1980-2003), Korea (1972-2003), and Mexico (1980-2003).  
10
 See Beffy et al. (2006) for details. 
 
11
 We provide a more detailed discussion of these filtering methods and their properties in the Appendix.  
We have also preferred the HP-6.25 filter to simple differencing because the HP produces a cyclical 
component that has a long-run average value of zero. This is a desirable property for a cyclical component, 
but it is strongly violated by output growth rates. 
 
 7 
In Figure 2 we plot the business cycle component of real GDP obtained using the 
HP filter with a smoothness parameter equal to 6.25, our benchmark method. Casual 
inspection of Figure 2 reveals that countries differ substantially in terms of cyclical 
behavior. This variability together with that of the tax rates should facilitate the empirical 
identification of the relationship between the tax rates and the business cycle. 
In order to assess the behavior of a tax rate over the cycle we then compute the 
correlation between the tax rate and the cyclical component of the corresponding 
country’s GDP: 
                                                 ctijti gdptaxcorr ,, ,                                                (1) 
where ctigdp ,  is the cyclical component of (log) output for country i at time t, and 
j
titax ,  is 
the tax rate j for country i at time t. 
Moreover, in order to differentiate between different phases of the cycle, we 
compute these correlations over expansions (defined as times of positive cyclical 
components) and downturns (defined as times of negative cyclical components). 
As a final test we try to assess how the tax rates respond to cyclical changes in 
GDP when all countries are considered together. To this purpose we estimate a simple 
bivariate relationship between tax rates (tax revenue as percentage of GDP) and cyclical 
(log) GDP: 
ti
c
ti
ti
gdp
GDP
Tax
,,
,
 





                                            (2) 
In particular we estimate equation (2) using OLS, country fixed effects (FE), country and 
time FE, and Instrumental Variables (we instrument cyclical GDP with lagged values of 
our dependent and independent variables). 
 8 
 
3. Results 
 
 For a preliminary assessment of the behavior of tax revenue over the cycle, we 
first compute the average total tax rates over the period 1965-2003 in periods of upturns 
(positive cyclical components of real GDP) and downturns (negative cyclical components 
of real GDP), and the value of total tax rates at peaks (the highest value of the cyclical 
component of real GDP) and troughs (the lowest value of the cyclical component of real 
GDP). The results are reported in Table 2. Looking at the table, it is possible to see that 
the behavior of the total tax rate over the phases of the cycle differs among countries. In 
particular, focusing on the first two columns of the table, it emerges that while for 13 of 
the 26 countries the tax rate is bigger during downturns than during upturns, for the rest 
half of the sample the tax rate is bigger during upturns. The differences, however, are 
never sizable. This balanced behavior during cyclical upturns and downturns is confirmed 
by averaging the tax rate over all countries in the sample: these averages are virtually 
identical in the two phases of the cycle.
12
 
Similarly, focusing on the last two columns of the table, it seems that Battaglini 
and Coate’s (2008) prediction that tax rates decrease during booms and increase in 
recessions cannot be confirmed.  If that prediction were true, we would expect tax rates at 
peaks to be lower than tax rates at troughs.  In fact, for most of the countries (15 out of 
26) we find the opposite result, and once again those tax rates averaged over countries are 
virtually the same at peaks and troughs. 
Next, as described in the previous section, we move to a more formal assessment 
of tax cyclicality by computing the correlations between tax rates and the cyclical 
                                                 
12
 Similar results are obtained for different tax rates. They are available upon request. 
 9 
components of (log) real GDP for each of the 26 OECD countries, over the period 1965-
2003.  The results are reported in Table 3.  The Table also reports the correlation between 
tax rates and GDP in cyclical downturns and upturns (columns 2 and 3). 
 Looking at the first column of Table 3, one can immediately see that, with the 
exception of the UK (for which there is a sizable and weakly statistically significant 
negative correlation), the correlation between tax rates and GDP is slight and not 
statistically significant. The result is broadly confirmed when we look at the correlation 
during cyclical downturns and upturns. However, for some countries (such as Greece and 
Italy) the absence of correlation over the all cycle is explained by the fact that tax revenue 
was negatively correlated to cyclical upturns and positively correlated over downturns. 
 These results are robust to the different filtering methods (HP-100 and BP) used 
to retrieve the cyclical components of real GDP, and to the use of the OECD’s output 
GAP measure.  In fact looking at Table 4, one can see that the absence of a strong and/or 
statistically significant correlation is confirmed for the great majority of cases.  We note 
that this finding that the tax rate is essentially uncorrelated with cyclical GDP is 
consistent with the Tax Smoothing hypothesis but inconsistent with both the standard 
Keynesian recommendation and Battaglini and Coate’s (2008) prediction. 
 So far, our analysis has focused on the total tax rate.  We now continue by looking 
at various different types of taxes and their correlation with cyclical GDP.  This is more 
than a robustness exercise: in fact, many of the relevant theories (including Battaglini and 
Coate, 2008) are formulated specifically in terms of income taxes.  Thus, it is important 
to differentiate between different tax rates.  In Table 5 we report the correlation between 
cyclical GDP and i) taxes on income, profits, and capital gains; ii) social security 
 10 
contributions; iii) taxes on payroll and workforce;  iv) taxes on property; v) taxes on 
goods and services; and vi) other taxes. 
 Starting with the results for income taxes (first column of Table 5), it is readily 
observed that the correlations are not significantly different from zero for all OECD 
countries in the sample (including the U.K.). This result suggests that income tax rates 
(i.e. income taxes as a % of GDP) are neutral over the cycle, contradicting Battaglini and 
Coate’s predictions of a negative correlation.13  Similar implications can be drawn for all 
the different tax rates, with the exception of the payroll tax rate for Canada, Denmark, 
and Ireland, and the tax rate on goods and services for Mexico, which are the only cases 
to show a statistically significant negative correlation with cyclical GDP.
14
 
So far, we have been assuming that the correlations between cyclical GDP and tax 
rates are time-invariant.  We now relax this assumption and allow these correlations to 
vary with time by estimating them for rolling 20-year windows for each country.  Figure 
3 shows how these time-varying correlations of the total tax rate with cyclical GDP have 
evolved over time.  Two basic results clearly stand out.  First, as expected, the results 
differ substantially among countries, and second, the assumption of time-invariant 
correlations appears questionable. For some countries (such as Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden) the correlation is increasing over time; for 
other countries (such as Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Korea Turkey and U.S.) it 
fluctuates around values close to zero (or slightly negative); while for the rest of the 
                                                 
13
 In fact, for the majority of countries, the point estimates of these correlations of cyclical GDP with the 
income tax rate are positive.  It is tempting to observe that this positive sign (though definitely the wrong 
sign for the Battaglini and Coate’s prediction) is consistent with the standard Keynesian recommendation, 
while the lack of statistical significance is consistent with the tax smoothing hypothesis. 
 
14
 Unlike the results for the income tax, the preponderance of the point estimates of the correlations of 
cyclical GDP with social security contributions and taxes on goods and services are negative.  This sign 
(though not the lack of statistical significance) is consistent with the Battaglini and Coate (2008) prediction. 
 11 
sample (Belgium, Iceland, Ireland and Luxembourg) it decreases toward sizeable (and 
statistically significant) negative values.  
Again, however, the results suggest that Battaglini and Coate’s prediction of a 
consistently negative correlation between GDP and the tax rate cannot be confirmed by 
the empirical evidence in most of the countries analyzed. 
As a next test we try to assess how tax rates respond to a cyclical change of GDP 
when all countries are considered together.  For this purpose we estimate a simple 
bivariate relationship between tax rates (again defined as tax revenue as a percentage of 
GDP) and cyclical GDP (equation 2).  The results are reported in Table 6, where in each 
column we present the results obtained with a different estimation method.
15
  Analyzing 
the results, one can observe that while the point estimate of the coefficient measuring the 
degree of cyclicality of the tax rate is negative, it is never statistically significant in any 
specification.  
Next, we allow for a richer lag structure to permit the tax rates respond to cyclical 
output changes with some delay.  To this end, we re-estimate the simple regression of tax 
rates with one, two, and three lags of cyclical output.
16
  The results, reported in Table 7, 
still point to the absence of a significant relation. 
As a final test, we re-estimate tax rates as functions of cyclical GDP and several 
control variables and interaction terms. In this way, we try to control for possible 
omission bias and we assess whether the smoothness of tax rates may depend 
                                                 
15
 We consider as instruments two lags of the cyclical GDP. The Anderson statistics, the Cragg-Donald 
Wald – statistics and the Sargan test of over-identification restrictions suggest that the choice of the 
instruments is appropriate. For simplicity we report only the Sargan test’s p-value in Table 6. Additional 
results are available from the authors upon request.  
 
16
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension, as well as the one outlined in the 
next paragraph.  
 12 
systematically on structural country characteristics.  In particular, the variables included 
in the analysis are: i) trade openness (measured by the sum of total exports and imports 
as a fraction of GDP); ii) country size (measured by the log of total population); iii) the 
Gini coefficient for income inequality; iv) and a political dummy, left, that takes the value 
of 1 for “left-leaning” governments, and zero otherwise.17  These variables are generally 
thought to be associated with tax revenue as a share of GDP.  For example, smaller and 
more open economies are generally characterized by a larger government size (Alesina 
and Wacziarg, 1998).  Left-leaning governments may also be associated with a larger tax-
to-GDP share, and countries with higher inequality may have an incentive to increase tax 
rates for redistribution purposes.  The results in Table 8 show that indeed these variables 
are associated with the share of total tax revenue in GDP; however, they do not affect the 
response of tax rates to cyclical GDP.  In particular, the estimated coefficients suggest 
that smaller and more open economies tend to have higher tax rates, and that income 
inequality also raises tax rates.  In contrast, the effect of a left-leaning government on 
taxes is not statistically significant.  The inclusion of these variables, both as control and 
as interaction terms, however, does not affect the estimated response of tax rates to 
cyclical GDP, so that the absence of a correlation between the tax rates and cyclical GDP 
is still confirmed. 
Our results are also robust to using different tax rates in the panel regressions.  
Table 9 reports the results of estimating regression (2) separately for each of the six types 
of taxes we considered above.  As the results indicate, the overwhelming majority of 
these estimates are statistically insignificant.  In particular, the coefficients for the income 
                                                 
17
 Data for trade openness and populations are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook 85 (2009), data for 
Gini coefficients are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (2009), and data for left governments are 
from the DPI Political Database. 
 13 
tax, as well as taxes on goods and services, payroll, and property taxes are never 
statistically significantly different from zero.  In contrast (at least, when we include 
country fixed effects) social security contributions appear to be negatively related to 
cyclical changes, while “other taxes” are positively associated with them.  Thus, this 
method also seems to confirm a generally neutral behavior of tax rates over the cycle. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigated the cyclicality of the average effective tax rate in order to 
investigate the validity of three theories of fiscal policy.  According to the standard 
Keynesian theory, tax policy should be counter-cyclical, i.e. tax rates should decrease in 
economic contractions and increase in expansions.  The Tax Smoothing hypothesis, 
instead, implies that changes in GDP should be uncorrelated with tax rates.  In contrast to 
these normative theories, a recent positive theory proposed by Battaglini and Coate 
(2008) predicts that the tax rate will be negatively correlated with GDP.
18
 
This paper relies on these very different theoretical implications in order to test 
the three theories.  We compute the correlations between tax revenue as a fraction of 
GDP and cyclical output for each of 26 OECD countries for which we have data from 
1965-2003.  The results show that the correlations are generally quite small and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
This finding is quite robust.  It is obtained when we look at the relationship 
between tax rates and cyclical GDP over upturns and downturns or at business-cycle 
                                                 
18
 It might be helpful to remind the reader that our focus has been on average effective tax rates (tax-to-
GDP ratios) rather than marginal tax rates.  While the latter is the relevant variable for many important 
economic issues (such as the effects of taxes on labor supply or long-run economic growth), our focus here 
has been on the cyclical properties of aggregate tax revenue, for which the former is appropriate. 
 
 14 
peaks and troughs.  It is also valid when we look at different tax rates, in addition to total 
taxes, such as income taxes, social security contributions, payroll taxes, property taxes, 
taxes on goods and services, and “other” taxes.  The results are also robust to assessing 
the relationship between tax rates and cyclical changes of GDP in a panel framework. 
Overall, the empirical evidence of our paper seems to be more consistent with the 
Tax Smoothing hypothesis than either the recommendations of the standard Keynesian 
model or the predictions of Battaglini and Coate’s (2008) theory.  This result calls for a 
new theory of fiscal policy that will be consistent with the empirical evidence on both 
government spending and government revenue (as well as debt) over the cycle. 
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Figure 1. Total Tax Rates (1965-2003) 
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Figure 2. Output – Cyclical Components (1965-2003) 
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Figure 3. Rolling 20-year window correlations (1965-2003) 
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Note: the time axis shows the 20-year window’s terminal year.  Thus, “1984” corresponds to the 
correlations over the period 1965-1984, “1985” to the correlations over 1966-1985, etc… 
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 Table 1. Average tax rates (% of GDP- Averaged over the period 1965-2003) 
 
Country 
Total 
Tax 
Income, 
Profits, Capital 
gains  
Social 
Security  
 
Payroll 
 
Property 
Goods 
and 
Services  
 
Others 
        
Australia 27.1 15.0 - 1.5 2.5 8.2 - 
Austria 26.4 10.6 12.3 2.7 1.0 12.8 0.4 
Belgium 41.9 15.9 13.0 - 1.1 11.8 - 
Canada 32.8 14.9 4.0 0.7 3.4 9.8 0.3 
Denmark 44.4 25.2 1.4 0.3 2.1 15.6 0.1 
Finland 40.0 16.2 8.8 0.9 1.0 13.5 0.1 
France 40.4 7.2 16.3 0.9 2.4 12.3 1.3 
Germany 36.1 11.8 12.8 0.2 1.3 10.1 - 
Greece 27.7 5.1 8.7 0.3 1.8 12.0 - 
Iceland 32.2 10.0 1.9 0.9 2.4 17.0 0.7 
Ireland 31.6 11.0 4.1 0.5 2.2 14.0 - 
Italy 34.2 10.6 11.7 0.2 1.5 10.0 1.9 
Japan 24.6 10.6 7.5 - 2.4 4.3 0.1 
Korea 17.9 5.1 1.3 0.1 2.0 9.0 0.5 
Luxembourg 38.1 15.3 10.5 0.3 2.7 9.3 0.1 
Mexico 17.3 4.6 2.5 0.2 0.3 9.5 0.2 
Netherlands 41.0 12.5 15.8 - 1.5 11.0 0.1 
Norway 40.3 15.4 8.9 - 1.0 15.0 0.2 
New Zeeland 31.6 19.7 - 0.4 2.3 9.3 - 
Portugal 26.1 6.3 7.3 0.4 0.8 11.1 0.4 
Spain 26.3 7.0 10.2 0.2 1.4 7.5 0.2 
Sweden 46.7 20.4 11.4 1.6 1.1 12.2 0.1 
Switzerland 26.4 11.4 6.9 - 2.2 5.9 - 
Turkey 19.5 6.9 2.8 - 1.0 7.3 2.4 
United Kingdom 35.3 13.7 6.0 - 4.3 10.8 1.0 
United States 26.6 12.6 5.9 - 3.3 4.9 - 
        
Average 32.7 12.2 8.5 0.8 1.9 10.6 0.5 
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Table 2. Total taxes over the cycle (%- Averaged over the period 1965-2003) 
 
country downturns upturns peaks troughs 
     
Australia  26.4 27.8 29.4 27.2 
Austria  27.0 25.7 30.5 27.0 
Belgium  42.0 41.8 37.9 40.6 
Canada  33.2 32.4 34.8 33.1 
Denmark  43.7 45.8 41.1 40.0 
Finland  41.4 38.5 43.0 44.9 
France  41.7 39.3 43.0 35.9 
Germany  36.5 35.7 36.8 32.2 
Greece  28.1 27.4 20.3 21.3 
Iceland  31.7 32.7 29.7 28.3 
Ireland  31.9 31.3 33.5 26.9 
Italy  34.5 33.9 25.7 26.1 
Japan  23.5 26.0 22.3 18.2 
Korea  17.9 17.9 16.6 21.1 
Luxembourg  37.9 38.4 31.4 42.4 
Mexico  17.4 17.2 15.7 16.7 
Netherlands  41.3 40.9 41.2 41.3 
Norway  40.0 40.7 42.5 43.5 
New Zeeland 31.1 32.0 30.4 23.2 
Portugal  25.1 27.0 18.4 20.8 
Spain  25.6 27.3 17.5 16.5 
Sweden  46.1 47.4 38.5 46.9 
Switzerland  26.8 25.9 25.0 28.5 
Turkey  20.3 18.7 28.4 35.1 
United Kingdom  35.6 34.9 31.4 34.4 
United States  26.7 26.6 25.5 27 
     
Average 32.0 32.0 30.4 30.8 
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Table 3. Correlations between total tax rates and cyclical output (1965-2003) 
 
country overall downturns upturns 
    
Australia  0.10 -0.04 -0.19 
Austria  -0.01 0.41 0.30 
Belgium  -0.09 0.00 -0.31 
Canada  -0.11 -0.19 0.16 
Denmark  0.09 0.10 -0.31 
Finland  -0.05 0.23 0.27 
France  -0.06 0.27 0.32 
Germany  0.06 0.66*** 0.16 
Greece  -0.10 0.45** -0.57*** 
Iceland  0.10 0.36 -0.38 
Ireland  -0.14 -0.20 0.00 
Italy  0.01 0.48** -0.47** 
Japan  0.17 0.10 -0.44** 
Korea  0.06 0.03 0.22 
Luxembourg  -0.13 -0.02 -0.57*** 
Mexico  -0.13 0.32 -0.40 
Netherlands  -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 
Norway  0.02 -0.27 0.10 
New Zeeland 0.03 0.30 -0.30 
Portugal  0.02 0.01 -0.33 
Spain  0.08 0.09 -0.14 
Sweden  0.09 0.07 -0.13 
Switzerland  -0.16 0.07 -0.19 
Turkey  -0.08 -0.39* 0.51** 
United Kingdom  -0.27* 0.02 -0.35 
United States  0.04 0.37 -0.10 
    
Average -0.01 0.09 -0.08 
                                 Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Correlations between total tax rates and output business cycle (1965-2003) 
 
country HP6.25 HP100 BP^ Output GAP 
     
Australia  0.10 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 
Austria  -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.31* 
Belgium  -0.09 -0.13 -0.25 -0.48*** 
Canada  -0.11 -0.05 -0.18 -0.20 
Denmark  0.09 0.08 -0.06 0.18 
Finland  -0.05 -0.06 -0.14 -0.09 
France  -0.06 -0.07 -0.26 -0.31 
Germany  0.06 0.08 0.06 0.00 
Greece  -0.10 -0.09 -0.27 -0.35* 
Iceland  0.10 0.26 0.14 0.07 
Ireland  -0.14 -0.20 -0.46*** -0.73*** 
Italy  0.01 -0.05 -0.22 -0.46** 
Japan  0.17 0.05 -0.17 0.24 
Korea  0.06 -0.05 -0.20 -0.10 
Luxembourg  -0.13 -0.16 -0.29 -0.61*** 
Mexico  -0.13 -0.12 -0.29 0.31 
Netherlands  -0.08 -0.05 -0.33* -0.34** 
Norway  0.02 0.09 0.26 0.50 
New Zeeland 0.03 0.09 0.16 -0.41** 
Portugal  0.02 0.03 -0.10 0.30 
Spain  0.08 0.02 -0.20 0.63*** 
Sweden  0.09 0.08 -0.07 0.05 
Switzerland  -0.16 -0.18 -0.44*** -0.26 
Turkey  -0.08 -0.01 0.09 -0.16 
United Kingdom  -0.27* -0.25 -0.40** -0.27 
United States  0.04 0.09 0.00 0.06 
     
Average -0.01 0.09 -0.08 -0.11 
                                 Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
      ^BP correlation are based on a lower number of observations (6)  
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Table 5. Correlations between various tax rates and output business cycle (1965-2003) 
Country 
Income, 
Profits, 
Capital 
gains  
 
Social 
Security  
 
Payroll 
 
Property 
 
Goods and 
Services  
 
Other 
       
Australia 0.16 - 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 - 
Austria 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.12 
Belgium -0.04 -0.07 - 0.06 -0.30 - 
Canada -0.00 -0.13 -0.64*** -0.26 -0.07 -0.23 
Denmark 0.02 0.06 -0.29** 0.09 0.34 - 
Finland 0.11 -0.10 -0.18 0.04 -0.6 - 
France 0.12 -0.08 -0.26 -0.06 -0.11 -0.10 
Germany 0.06 0.00 -0.22 -0.08 0.18 - 
Greece -0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 - 
Iceland 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.22 0.02 
Ireland -0.02 0.01 -0.45** -0.11 -0.22 - 
Italy 0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.15 0.04 0.37 
Japan 0.31 0.01 - -0.02 -0.04 - 
Korea 0.07 -0.03 - 0.08 0.15 -0.03 
Luxembourg -0.11 -0.24 -0.12 0.13 -0.12 - 
Mexico 0.37 0.10 0.29 0.36 -0.40** -0.20 
Netherlands 0.02 -0.18 - 0.16 0.06 0.02 
Norway 0.05 -0.03 - -0.10 0.15 0.27 
New Zeeland 0.13 - -0.27 0.08 -0.07 - 
Portugal 0.09 0.01 -0.19 0.14 -0.03 -0.06 
Spain 0.11 0.05 - 0.20 0.06 -0.15 
Sweden 0.30 0.00 0.03 0.10 -0.09 -0.06 
Switzerland -0.15 -0.15 - -0.03 -0.09 - 
Turkey -0.03 -0.17 - -0.16 -0.09 0.33 
United Kingdom -0.17 -0.07 - 0.03 -0.17 -0.22 
United States 0.22 -0.12 - -0.02 -0.13 - 
       
Average 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.01 
      Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Response of tax rates to output business cycle (1965-2003) 
 OLS Country FE 
Country & 
Time FE IV 
degree of cyclicality ( ) -4.21 -4.51 -6.32 -26.15 
 (-0.23) (-0.79) (-1.04) (-0.42) 
     
Number of Observations 976 976 976 947 
     
R
2 
0.00 0.00 0.13 - 
 
Sargan Statisticis p-value    0.84 
 
    
       Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Response of tax rates to output business cycle (1965-2003)- OLS 
 One lag Two lags Three lags 
degree of cyclicality ( ) 5.76 5.61 10.559 
 (0.32) (0.31) (0.52) 
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Response of different tax rates to output business cycle (1965-2003) 
 I II III IV 
degree of cyclicality ( ) -6.16 -6.01 -1.02 -28.07 
 (-0.39) (-0.35) (-0.05) (-1.00) 
Openness 8.14 - - - 
 (19.36)*** - - - 
Openness*Cyclical 
Output
 
-15.83 - - - 
 
(-0.60) - - - 
Population - -1.67 - - 
 
- (-9.37)*** - - 
Population*Cyclical 
Output - 0.22 - - 
 
- (0.02) - - 
Gini - - 31.56 - 
 
- - (5.71)*** - 
Gini* Cyclical Output  - - -97.29 - 
 
- - (-0.27) - 
Left Government - - - -0.167 
 
- -  (-0.24) 
Left Gov.*Cyclical 
Output
 
- - - 86.21 
 
   (1.80)* 
Number of  Observations 949 975 835 634 
 
    
R
2 
0.28 0.08 0.04 0.01 
 
    
       Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Response of different tax rates to output business cycle (1965-2003) 
 OLS Country FE 
Country & 
Time FE IV
 
Income Tax 5.63 5.22 1.75 0.97 
 (0.51) (1.13) (0.44) (0.03) 
Social Security -6.14 -7.09 -6.92 -24.48 
 (-0.41) (-1.66)* (-2.32)** (-0.81) 
Payroll
 
-1.40 -1.09 -0.39 2.98 
 
(-0.58) (-1.19) (-0.36) (0.29) 
Property -0.65 0.10 0.42 -1.05 
 
(-0.08) 0.09 0.36 (-0.14) 
Goods and Services -3.69 -3.81 -2.79 -1.48 
 
(-0.55) (-1.36) (-0.98) (-0.06) 
Others 0.69 2.30 2.72 1.77 
 
(0.35) (2.11)** (2.23)** (0.24) 
 
    
       Note: t-statistics in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
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Appendix- Filtering Methods 
 
The first two methods use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, proposed by Hodrick 
and Prescott (1980). The filter decomposes the series into a cyclical  tic ,  and a trend 
 tig ,  component, by minimizing with respect to tig , , for 0 , the following quantity: 
     



 
T
t
T
t
titititi gggy
1
1
2
2
1,1,
2
,,                                        (A1) 
The first method uses the value recommended by Hodrick and Prescott for annual data 
for the smoothness parameter (  ) equal to 100.  The second method sets the smoothness 
parameter (  ) equal to 6.25. In this way, as pointed out by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter produces cyclical components comparable to those obtained by 
the Band-Pass filter. 
The third method makes use of the Band-Pass (BP) filter proposed by Baxter and 
King (1995) and evaluated by Stock and Watson (1998) and Christiano and Fitzgerald 
(1999) who also compare its properties to those of the HP filter.  The low pass (LP) filter 
)(L , which forms the basis for the band pass filter, selects a finite number of moving 
average weights h  to minimize: 
                                                        


 dQ
2
)( ,                                
(A2)  
where  
K
Kh
h
hLL  )(  and  

K
Kh
hi
hK e
 )( .  The LP filter uses )(K  to 
approximate the infinite MA filter )( . Let’s define )()()(   .  Then, 
minimizing Q,, we minimize the discrepancy between the ideal LP filter )(  and its 
finite representation )(K  at frequency  .  The main objective of the BP filter as 
 28 
implemented by Baxter and King (1995) is to remove both the high frequency and low 
frequency component of a series, leaving the business-cycle frequencies.   This is 
obtained by subtracting the weights of two low pass filters.  We define L  and H , the 
lower and upper frequencies of two low pass filters as respectively 8 and 2 for annual 
data.  We therefore remove all fluctuations shorter than two or longer than eight years.  
The frequency representation of the band pass weights becomes )()( LKHK   , and 
forms the basis of the Baxter-King filter which provides an alternative estimate of the 
trend and the cyclical component. 
 
